This research develops a theory about the role of inequality in the overtaking of growth performance across countries. The theory captures two opposing effects of inequality on factor accumulation and suggests that the qualitative change in their combined effect is a prime cause of overtaking. Due to the initial dominance of the positive effect of inequality, a less egalitarian economy undergoes a higher growth path in the short run, followed by a lower growth path in the long run. It is also shown that divergence or convergence may arise instead of overtaking, depending on the initial levels of development and inequality.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two centuries, the evolution of the world income distribution has been characterized by shifts in the ranking of countries, as well as the great divergence and a recent convergence among industrialized economies. As documented by Maddison (2001) , the Netherlands, whose per capita GDP had been the highest in Europe since 1600, was overtaken by the United Kingdom towards the end of the ninetieth century. The economic leadership was then replaced by the United states in the beginning of the twentieth century. Outside the Western world, Japan and newly industrializing countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) had overtaken Argentina and Chile during the second half of the twentieth century. 1 Growth theorists have attempted to construct the theoretical foundations that account for these unpredictable phenomena, and three major approaches have been proposed so far. The Þrst approach, taken by Brezis et al. (1993) , suggests that overtaking reßects country-speciÞc learning effects in the existing technology and the resulting comparative disadvantage of a leading economy in adopting a new technology. The second approach highlights the international ßows of ideas. Goodfriend and McDermott (1998) argue that familiarity with a trading partner facilitates technological spillovers and enhances learning productivity, human capital accumulation, and growth. Thus, overtaking is caused by unilateral familiarization of a less developed country with the leading country. 2 The third approach focuses on the changing role of natural resources in the process of development. suggest that while land abundance is beneÞcial for the process of development in early stages, it hinders the execution of education reform that is a precondition for industrialization and sustained growth.
This research examines the role of income inequality in the overtaking of growth performance across countries. It employs a uniÞed approach that captures two opposing effect of inequality on factor accumulation, and thereby examines the link between initial income distribution and the pattern of development. Inequality promotes physical capital accumulation by stimulating savings of the rich, whose marginal propensity to save is relatively high. 3 At the same time, in the presence of credit market imperfections, low-income households have limited access to loans to Þnance their education. 4 Since each individual's investment in human capital is subject to diminishing marginal returns, concentrating resources into a small part of the population retards the accumulation of aggregate human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993) .
The relationship between distribution of personal income and economic growth has been one of the most controversial topics in macroeconomics over the last decade. Despite considerable number of empirical investigations, little is known about the relationship between these two factors within a single country. Most studies in the 1990s support the view that inequality is a hindrance to growth, while some recent studies Þnd that their relationship turns positive in the short run. 5 Although these puzzling results would reßect, to some extent, differences in estimation methods as well as data quality, it appears that this empirical ambiguity may reßect opposing forces that operate simultaneously. 6 The proposed theory attributes the overtaking to a qualitative change in the combined effect of inequality on physical and human capital accumulation. The positive effect of inequality on physical capital accumulation is dominant in the early stages of development, where the return to skill is low relative to the return to physical capital and the saving-rate differential among the rich and poor is signiÞcant. Capital accumulation and the accompanying increase in wages, however, raises the return to skill and reduces the saving-rate differential, reversing the qualitative effect of initial inequality in later stages. 7 The eventual dominance of the negative effect of inequality generates multiple steadystate equilibria. A country characterized by a substantially equal distribution will converge to the higher-level steady state, in terms of per capita output, where all individuals can equally acquire skills and accumulate wealth. On the other hand, a country characterized by a highly unequal distribution will converge to the lower-level steady state, where unskilled workers are unable to accumulate wealth and inequality exists persistently between skilled and unskilled workers. The initial distribution of wealth therefore plays a signiÞcant role in determining both long-run growth performance and individuals' welfare. 8 The lower-level steady state act as a development trap because, without a substantial increase in output or equality, countries in this state cannot permanently escape from stagnation. Despite the necessity of reducing inequality, those countries will encounter capitalists' strong resistance to redistribution. As will be 5 See Barro (2000) as well as Benabou's (1996) careful overview of the empirical studies in the early 1990s. A recent empirical work by Forbes (2000, p. 885) concludes that "the relationship between inequality and growth is far from resolved." 6 For instance, Dußo (2000a, 2000b) argue that the difference in previous estimates is partly due to the linearity of the models. Atkinson and Brandolini (1999) Þnd inappropriate to simply use "high quality" observations in Deininger and Squire's (1996) data set on income inequality. 7 Due to the complementarity between skill and physical capital in production, the return to skill rises as physical capital accumulates. See Goldin and Katz (1998) for empirical evidence. Perotti (1996) Þnds that income equality encourages investment in education more signiÞcantly in a group of high-income countries. 8 See Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993). shown later, capitalists can hold higher wealth in the lower-level steady state than in the others, and thus redistribution is undesirable from their short-term and long-term viewpoints.
Overtaking therefore results from the initial dominance of the positive effect of inequality and the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. A less egalitarian economy would undergo a higher growth path in the short run, followed by a lower growth path in the long run. Once overtaken, the country can never catch up with the leader and the income gap remains open. Furthermore, divergence applies to countries starting out in the mature stages of development where the adverse effect of inequality on human capital outweighs the positive effect of inequality on aggregate saving.
Paradoxically, overtaking is likely to occur under the condition that the marginal productivity of physical capital is higher relative to human capital. In such a circumstance, a major fraction of national income is dominated by asset owners since production of Þnal output relies largely on physical capital. This uneven system of factor payments slows down the increase in wages relative to output, intensifying the adverse effect of credit constraints on human capital accumulation. It should be noted that the share of the labor income is less important for egalitarian economies where many individuals obtain asset earnings as well as wages.
Although the analysis suggests that inequality in the early stages of development has a positive effect on the growth process, there are two prime forces that make overtaking less probable than divergence. The one is that, as noted above, the positive effect of inequality is the dominant factor only in underdeveloped stages, where the saving rate differential among individuals is large. The other is that globalization of international capital markets encourages the ßow of capital across borders, which makes domestic saving less important for physical capital accumulation. The positive aspect of inequality would thus be more relevant to the process of development experienced by currently developed countries.
This general tendency of divergence is supported by some empirical evidence. Benabou (1996) examines the role of inequality in economic development of South Korea and the Philippines, which were similar with respect to all major macroeconomic variables, such as GDP per capita, population, urbanization, and secondary school enrollment in the early 1960s. As a key factor to interpret South Korea's superior growth performance over the next 25 years, Benabou points out the signiÞcant difference in their initial distributions of income and land ownership. Inequality was much lower in South Korea as a result of its successful land reform following World War II. In this respect, Birdsall et al. (1995) suggest that policies that reduced poverty and income inequality, such as improving the quality of basic education and augmenting labor demand, have stimulated East Asian economies' growth since the 1960s. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) and argue that the divergence in income levels between North and Latin America, observed in the second half of the twentieth century, may be attributed partly to their different distributions of land ownership.
Turning to income convergence, countries will converge to the same steady state provided that they possess similar economic structures and levels of initial inequality. In particular, a country with moderate inequality can evolve toward the higher-level steady state through the transition from selective to universal human capital accumulation. Even though inequality delays the spread of education in society, moderate inequality permits the economy to reach a stage of development where unskilled workers are wealthy enough to support their children. 9 The resulting universal investment in education fuels the process of development, and credit constraints become less binding among the poor over time with the improvement of inequality. The growth process of the economy with moderate inequality would be associated with the evolution of some currently developed countries, which might have experienced a rise and fall of inequality over the last century, as surveyed by Kuznets (1955) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the basic structure of the model, and short-run equilibrium is derived in Section 2. The analytical framework is based on Galor and Moav's (2001) uniÞed growth model that features four fundamental elements: capital market imperfections, altruistic linkage, capitalskill complementarity, and the increasing marginal propensity to save as a result of consumers' optimal behaviors.
There are two clear aspects that distinguish the current paper from Galor and Moav's research. First, they do not address the issue of overtaking and divergence. Galor and Moav divide the process of industrialization into four stages, and examine the effect of inequality in one stage on subsequent growth within the same stage (i.e., short-run growth). This paper, by contrast, studies longer-term growth beyond the initial stage so as to observe the diverse patterns of development. Second, Galor and Moav's analysis executes the moderate redistribution of wealth so that the ex-ante state of the economy is maintained. Drastic wealth redistribution, however, brings the economy into a state of widespread education, and this situation would be associated with the experience of some East Asian countries that markedly improved inequality after World War II. 10 The analysis in Section 3 carries out both drastic and moderate redistributions of wealth.
In order to accomplish these two objectives, Section 3 Þrst elucidates the global behavior of the dynamical system that governs the evolution of inequality and demonstrates the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. Using these results, Section 4 analyzes the impact of wealth distribution on the behavior of output growth, by comparing the growth paths of hypothetical economies that differ only in their initial wealth distributions. The last section summarizes the discussion and proposes future research. Proofs of technical results are placed in the Appendix.
THE MODEL
Consider a closed overlapping-generations economy with heterogeneous agents in which activities occur over inÞnite discrete time. People invest in assets and education in the presence of imperfect capital markets. Producers employ the resulting physical and human capital through perfectly competitive markets, and generate a single Þnal good that can be consumed or relinquished to the next generation. Population and the level of technology are exogenously determined and constant over time.
Producers
The amount of aggregate output produced at time t, Y t , is determined by the aggregate stock of physical capital, K t , and that of human capital, H t , which are available in the economy at time t. The production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
where α ∈ (0, 1), k t ≡ K t /H t , and A > 0 stands for a level of technology. The market price of the Þnal good is normalized to 1. Production operates by hiring workers and renting the services of physical capital from households through the competitive markets, without incurring any adjustment costs. In contrast to individuals' loans for education, Þrms can rent physical capital under no liquidity constraints on the grounds that physical capital is easily collateralized. Hence, they maximize their proÞts given the market wage per unit of human capital, w t , and the rental price per unit of physical capital, r t . Those Þrms are represented by a single producer who maximizes f (k t )H t −w t H t −r t K t by choosing K t and H t . Then the Þrst-order conditions are given by
which are the inverse demand functions for K t and H t in terms of the factor ratio k t . The rate of return to human capital, w t , increases with physical capital due to the complementarity between them. Physical capital depreciates at a constant rate of δ ∈ [0, 1] in every period. 
where β ∈ (0, 1) andθ > 0. The underlying assumption of (3) is that intergenerational transfers are a luxury good and are motivated by parents' "joy of giving." The nonnegative amount of wealth is necessarily transferred to offspring since the utility is an increasing function of b t+1 . In period 0, old people in society are divided into two groups, S (Small) and L (Large). Group i (i = S, L) involves a fraction λ i of them, where
and λ i remains unchanged over time once determined in period 0. Members within a group are endowed with the same amount of wealth, I i 0 , whereas individuals between the two groups may differ in this regard. As follows from (3), this between-group inequality generates the difference in their intergenerational transfers. On the other hand, since members within one group are completely homogeneous, their descendents behave identically in all subsequent periods. Hence an individual who is descended from group i and is born in period t may be referred to as a member i of generation t.
In the Þrst period, when young, individuals consume part of their parents' wealth to live and spend the entire time to acquire skills. The formation of human capital is augmented by investing physical resources in education, and the investment during the Þrst period is the only way to enhance human capital. Hence, individuals allocate their inheritance between education (investment in human capital) and savings (investment in physical capital). The amount saved by a member i of generation t is thus
where b i t is the transfer from his/her parent and e i t is the real expenditure on education. In the second period, when old, the individual acquires the resulting human capital h i t+1 ≡ h(e i t ), which is an increasing function with strict concavity and Inada conditions. 11 Individuals acquire only basic skills in the absence of the real expenditure on education, and the associated level of human capital is h(0) = 1. Wage income is obtained by supplying the acquired human capital inelastically in competitive labor markets. In addition, those who have savings rent out capital services to producers at the market price. Then the second-period wealth of a member i of generation t, I i t+1 , is
where R t+1 = 1 + r t+1 − δ. The budget constraint of the individual is given by
1.2.2. Optimization. Each member of generation t maximizes his/her utility from (3) subject to (5). The optimal amount of transfer chosen by a member i of generation t is
where θ ≡θ(1 − β)/β > 0 can be interpreted as the minimum need of current consumption. Since the bequest function and the associated saving function exhibit convexity, inequality in wealth augments national saving.
Observe that the indirect utility strictly monotonically increases with the second period's wealth, I i t+1 . It then follows from (4) that utility is maximized by choosing the education costs that maximize I i t+1 . Therefore, the optimal level of education in the face of no credit constraints, denoted as e t , is
where individuals regard both wage and interest rate as given and predict these future variables accurately at time t. The Þrst order condition is
Also, e t = 0 for w t+1 = 0 since zero wage yields no return on investment in education. Then noting w t+1 = w(k t+1 ) and R t+1 = 1 + r t+1 − δ ≡ R(k t+1 ) from (2), there exists a continuous single-valued function
such that e(0) = 0 and e 0 (k t+1 ) > 0 for all k t+1 > 0. 12 The intuition of the positive reaction of education to the capital-labor ratio is straightforward: an increase in k t+1 enhances the return on human capital, w t+1 , while it reduces the return on savings, R t+1 . e t is hence independent of b i t , meaning that it is most favored among all young members at time t. In other words, e t is the education expenditure one is willing to pay if one can.
Next consider the optimal educational decision in light of credit constraints. It is assumed that imperfect capital markets completely limit access to credit, and young members are unable to make loans for education. Then a member i of generation t invests in education according to
12 In contrast to the present model, Galor and Moav (2001) propose Regime I, a state of the economy with no investment in education, which nulliÞes the adverse effect of inequality on production. Inequality therefore enhances the process of development in this regime. We will prove that this positive effect of inequality exists even in the absence of Regime I.
Contrary to the Þrst case, e i t will be heterogeneous across the two groups, depending on their transfer amounts. The resultant savings are expressed as
Substitution for b i t from the budget constraint into the above expression yields s i t = I i t − c i t − e i t , meaning that savings equal parent's wealth minus household's consumption and education costs. s i t can hence be viewed as the amount saved by a household in period t, rather than an individual of generation t. Taking (10) and (11) into account, the wealth in the second period (4) is modiÞed to
This shows that members who inherit a larger amount of transfer will earn higher income. Hence, in light of (6),
, where i, j = S, L and i 6 = j. 13 In words, the initial ranking of wealth among people is never reversed in the future.
The Formation of Aggregate Capital
In a closed economy, the net amount of total investment equals total income minus total expenditures. Thus,
Since people receive no income when young, the total wealth of the economy in period t is owned by old individuals in period t, meaning
Substituting (14) into (13) and using s i t = I i t − c i t − e i t with (11), aggregate physical capital is
where
can be best thought of as total resources the economy possesses in period t since they are allocated between investment in physical and human capital. Proceeding, it follows from (10) that the total stock of human capital is
13 These rules apply throughout the present paper.
Then by deÞnition, the future ratio of the two capital stocks is
SHORT-RUN EQUILIBRIUM
Since individuals at time t are capable of predicting k t+1 accurately, their expectation of k t+1 in (17) must coincides with the actual level of k t+1 in (9). In other words, k t+1 in equilibrium satisÞes both (9) and (17) for a given pair
Existence and Uniqueness
The equilibrium condition precludes the situation max(b S t , b L t ) < e t , which applies to the Þrst case of (17). Namely, members of the richer group are never credit-constrained in equilibrium. This is because, if max(b S t , b L t ) < e t , there would be no savings and
To examine the second and third cases of (17), one can unify them into a single form
whereby k(e t ; b i t , b j t , λ i ) and k(e t ; B t , 0, 1) respectively correspond to the second and third cases. λ is viewed as the number of members who are not credit-constrained. b e t is the average level of their transfers at time t. b c t is the average level of transfers at time t owned by members who are credit-constrained.
k 
The equilibrium level of the factor intensity, which solves (9) and (17), is now expressed as
indicates the richer group, and that whether λ equals λ S , λ L , or 1 is determined endogenously by a pair Figure 1 geometrically represents the equilibrium levels of the factor intensity and education as an intersection of either
k(e t ; B t , 0, 1) and e t = e(k t+1 ). The choice of the intersection is determined by the ratio of transfers between the two groups, b S
The Credit Constraint Frontier
In order to understand E S , E L , and E * geometrically, we will introduce the credit constraint frontier, CC i , on which members of group j spend the entire amount of transfers on the desirable level of education, leaving no savings. That is,
Lemma 1. There exists a single-valued function b
ii. ϕ j (0) = 0 and
Proof. Noting (19) and (20), let
In light of the Þrst result of the lemma, one can Þnd
In words, whether a young individual is credit-constrained or not depends on the relative amount of b S t and b L t . If one group inherits a greater amount of wealth than the other, the desirable level of education is likely to cost more than the latter can afford to pay.
The results of Lemma 1 are summarized graphically in Figure 2 . E L is located above the CC S line, E S is below the CC L line and E * corresponds to the region between E S and E L . Moreover, CC S ∪ CC L = {0} and the infeasibility of the third case in (17) gives E S ∪E L ∪E * = R 2 + . Noting that the credit-constraint frontiers are the boundaries of E * and the other sets, (20) assures the continuity of discussion sometimes uses the inverse function of ϕ i , denoted as µ j . In the diagram, for instance, the CC L line is expressed by both 
+ with the three regimes. For analytical convenience, the origin (0, 0) is deÞned as their intersection. By noting that the isoquant curve of B t has a negative constant slope −λ S /λ L , one can Þnd that the economy's regime is determined by distribution of B t as well as the level of B t . The economy with a pair of transfers (b S t , b L t ) ∈ R 2 + \R 2 ++ is in Regime 1 in period t, a state where young members of one group have no resources for investment. Such a pair can be regarded as a distribution extremely biased toward the other group. If
++ \E * , then the economy belongs to Regime 2, where all young members receive transfers although those in the poorer group face credit constraints. Finally, the remaining region, E * , corresponds to Regime 3, where B t is most equally distributed among the three regimes, and all individuals can afford to attain the desirable level of education.
15 Regimes 1-3 in the present paper are the counterparts of Stages I-III (of Regime II) in Galor and Moav (2001) . As revealed below, the economy does not necessarily go through each stage in the process of development. For this reason, Stages I-III are renamed as Regimes 1-3. The counterpart of their Regime I does not exist in our model as discussed in Footnote 12.
Inequality and Productivity
It follows from (1), (15) and (16) 
As follows from (2) and (7), e t is the maximizer of the right hand side of (22), and thus the envelope theorem veriÞes the expression of
Hence the isoquant of Y t+1 exhibits convexity in the (b S t , b L t ) space; it is strictly convex to the origin in the regions E S and E L , and has a constant slope −λ S /λ L in region E * . Noting that the isoquant of B t has a slope of −λ S /λ L , a great change in b S t /b L t not only worsens between-group inequality but also affects the level of output adversely.
Equally important,
meaning that the adverse effect of between-group inequality in transfers on output is more signiÞcant when the number of richer members is smaller. These results reßect the fact that inequality lowers intertemporal productivity as a result of the constrained investment in human capital. Since personal human capital increases disproportionately with the cost of investment, concentrating resources towards a small portion of the population reduces the aggregate level of human capital. Note that redistribution of transfers in period t has no positive impact on physical capital and output in period t + 1. By contrast, redistribution of income in period t generates a trade-off in period t + 1 between the efficiency in production and the abundance of resources.
THE DYNAMICAL SYSTEM
This section explores the global behavior of the dynamical system that governs the evolution of wealth inequality in the process of development. Plugging (2) and (9) into (12) and then using (19), we obtain
It then follows from (6) that the evolution of intergenerational transfers within a group is
is fully determined by the dynamical system that consists of the initial condition In order to simplify the following analysis of the dynamical system, we assume complete capital depreciation, δ = 1, so that R t = r t . 16 The stock variable I i t is then reduced to a ßow variable, the income obtained in period t.
The BB Locus
In order to fully understand the dynamics of transfers, it is necessary to characterize the BB S and BB L loci. BB i is deÞned as all pairs of
16 Assuming δ ∈ [0, 1) would not alter any qualitative properties of the dynamcal system.
As is established in (27), the domain of the function
is divided into E * , E i , E j and Z i , depending on the relative amount of b S t to b L t , as well as their total amount. The following discussion characterizes BB i and the dynamics of transfers in each of these four sets.
It would be plausible to assume that a nontrivial, locally stable, steady-state equilibrium exists when all members are free from credit constraints. This situation occurs if the technology is advanced enough to satisfy
where A(α, β, θ) is a continuous single-valued function. 17
Biased to the Group Itself. First, consider the dynamics of b i t when resource distribution is biased toward group i. In light of (27), deÞne
by noting that e t is the maximizer of I i t+1 , as shown in (7), and that b i t − e t = K t+1 /λ i from (15). Thus, an increase in b j t raises richer members' transfer b i t+1 by reducing the capital ratio.
, and the properties of Y (b i t , 0, 1) shown earlier establish the result.
As will become evident, the following lemma shows that the smaller the number of the rich, the more wealth their offspring inherit in a steady state.
and ψ Ri (0, 0) < 0 as shown earlier, the results follow except for the continuity. For the continuity ofb(λ), it is enough to prove
Sinceb is a steady-state value higher than b, βR(k(b(1), 0, 1)) < 1. Then the result follows from
∀λ ∈ (0, 1]. The continuity of b(λ) is similarly proven.
It would be reasonable to suppose that the desirable level of education exhibits a concave reaction to the factor ratio, and this condition greatly simpliÞes the exposition of the following lemma. Recall that µ j stands for the inverse function of ϕ i . 
ii.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
It thus follows from (32) that any pair
is an element of the BB S locus, as indicated by the solid black lines. The slope of ξ L (b S t ) is zero on the b S t axis. b S t = b S a and b S b at point a and b respectively. Without the concavity of e(k t+1 ), it might be the case thatb i 6 = b i min orb i 6 = b i max and that some discrete sets, on which ξ j (b i t ) does not exist, emerge on the interval
. Nevertheless, the basic results of the present paper can be maintained, as will be shown later. 
We next describe the BB i locus that belongs to E * \Z i , where resources are distributed in a relatively equal fashion. In light of (27), we deÞne
where 
The pairs (b , ζ j (b )) and (b, ζ j (b)) are the bifurcation points such that 
Proof. See the Appendix.
The second property of the lemma implies that there exists a value of 
would coincide at points a and b.
Biased to the Other Group. Thirdly, consider the dynamics of b i t when wealth distribution is biased toward group j. In light of (27), let Figure 5 . A Discrete Portion of the BB S Locus (c)
Notes. The solid black line featured is part of the BB S locus. The line ς L (b S t ) divides the space into two regions, where
Lemma 7. Under (29), there exists a continuous single-valued function b
ii. There exists a value of b i t such that ς j (b i t ) = ϕ j (b i t ). iii.
Proof. ii. Lemma 6 implies that
, and that there exists a value of
. This establishes the result. See the Appendix for the other parts.
Letb j ≡ ς j (0); that is, w(k(b j , 0, λ j )) = θ.b j is a critical level for universal human capital accumulation. If members of group j, the rich, bequeath wealth more thanb j , the resultant high wage level induces members of group i, the unskilled, to transfer wealth to their offspring. Figure 5 depicts the properties of the function
) ∈ E L is an element of the BB S locus, as illustrated by the solid black line. The slope of
Proof. Noting (2), we deÞne
As follows from the above lemma, we getb j =b(λ j ) andb L ≤b S .
The propertyb 0 (λ) < 0 can be thought of in the following manner. An increase in the richer group's transfer raises the capital-skill ratio and thus the wage level, w t+1 . Hence a smaller number of richer members in society requires each of them to save a greater amount of transfers, b j t , in order to obtain w t+1 = θ. One can easily demonstrate that A and α respectively have negative and positive correlations withb(λ). Due to the complementarity between technology and skill, a more productive technology increases the wage for a given k t+1 and thus reducesb(λ) for all λ. An increase in α, the capital share, implies a greater dependance of production on physical capital, and human capital becomes less important in production. The wage level then declines for a given k t+1 , and accordingly a higher level of b t is required to satisfy w t+1 = θ. As α approaches 1, w t+1 goes to zero and thereforeb(λ) must go to inÞnity for all λ.
We are now in a position to describe the BB i locus for the fourth (and Þnal) case, (b S t , b L t ) ∈ Z i . This is the situation in which members i of generation t are not wealthy enough to leave any amount of transfers to their descendants. Obviously,
3.2. Conditional Dynamics Figure 6 constructs the entire BB S locus by combining Figures 4-5. Once the set Z i is characterized, the direction of the motion of b i t can be described by using (34), (32), (36) and (37). The following technical results are useful to identify Z i on the (b S t , b L t ) space. 
The two lemmas reveal that, in Figure 6 , the dotted line on which I S t+1 = θ exists between the b L t axis and the BB S locus passing through (b, b), and Z S appears on the left-hand side of the dotted line. Accordingly, one can indicate the directions of b S t by the short arrows and can use the long arrows to show that b S t+1 jumps to zero. Further characterizations of Z i provide no additional information on the qualitative nature of the dynamical system and one can neglect them without loss of generality.
Global Dynamics
The previous results enable us to analyze the global dynamic behavior of transfers. By utilizing the phase diagrams, we demonstrate that the initial distribution of transfers between the two groups determines both short-run and long-run economic
performances. To conduct the analysis, it would be reasonable to assume
, and k(b(λ), 0, λ) is strictly increasing in λ as follows from (31). The assumption is feasible becauseb(λ) and thus k(b(λ), 0, λ) increase with A for all λ ∈ (0, 1]. The Þrst inequality in (38) states that the technology is not productive enough to nullify the role of distribution; if the inequality is violated, parental transfers eventually occur in all households regardless of their initial asset holdings. The second inequality states that unskilled workers who own no assets would transfer wealth to their offspring if they were in the higher-level steady state in Regime 3. It will become apparent that the magnitude of the gap betweenb i ≡b(λ i ) and
changes the nature of the dynamical system.
Lemma 11. Under (38), there exists a unique λ • ∈ (0, 1) such that
Proof. By notingk = k(b(λ), 0, λ), (38) assures the existence of a λ such thatb(λ) = b(λ). The other results follow fromb 0 (λ) <b 0 (λ) < 0 ifb(λ) =b(λ), which is shown by simple calculations.
Remark 1. By noting λ S = 1 − λ L < 0.5, the corollary rules out the simultaneous
Among several possible cases, Þrst considerb S ≥b S andb L <b L as a benchmark. Figure 7 illustrates the global behavior of the dynamical system. The diagram is the result of the combination of Figure 6 , which features group S, and the hypothetical Þgure which features group L. Such a combination is formed by means of three simpliÞcations. First, the diagram omits the range of absolute poverty, Z S ∪ Z L , on the grounds that the omission does not affect the direction of motion of transfers, as shown in Figure 6 . Second, the BB locus is drawn to be gradual, and this way of drawing rules out some steady states that otherwise would exist. Third, we assume the strict concavity of e(·) so that some potential steady states are neglected, as discussed previously. It will be clear that the qualitative nature of the system is robust to alternative assumptions.
Steady-state equilibria occur at the intersections of BB S and BB L . Among them, (0, 0), (b S , 0), and (b,b) are locally stable, whereas all the others are unstable. The system therefore exhibits the multiplicity of nontrivial, locally stable, steady-state equilibria, implying that the distribution of transfers determines the steady-state point to which the economy converges. Observe that steady-state equilibrium does not occur 
Notes. The Þgure describes the evolution of the transfers for the two groups whose sizes differ substantially. b at (0,b L ). Also, note that the transitional behavior of b i t is not necessarily monotonic, and that the economy enter may enter Regime 2 from Regime 3.
It is worth while mentioning that the diagram illustrates the growth path proposed by Galor and Moav (2001) . According to their scenario, the economy starts out with the pair of b L 0 > b L and b S 0 = 0. Hence the initial state is Regime 1 where b L t increases over time and members in group S remain uneducated. When b L t exceedsb L , the economy enters Regime 2 and the level of b S t begins to ascend. At this stage, members in group S receive education in the presence of liquidity constraints. The economy Þnally reaches Regime 3 where the constraints are no longer binding, converging towards (b,b).
As established in Lemma 3, the economy is characterized by b S < b L < b and b <b L <b S , which holds independently of the ratiob i /b i . In light of Figure 7 , the propertyb <b L <b S implies that unequal distribution is beneÞcial for members of group S in the long run, as well as in the short run. However, it is proven below that unequal distribution is undesirable for the long-run performance of economic growth. Proof. Consider Figure 7 , where ζ j (b) =b and ζ j (b i t ) is vertically sloped at b i t =b, as proved by Lemma 6. Moreover, the proof of Lemma 2 implies βR(k(b, 0, 1)) < 1, and
the use of (59) and (63) in the Appendix establishes To summarize, high inequality lowers the growth performance of wealthy countries in the long run, whereas it would prevent less developed countries from degenerating. This Þnding is in correlation with recent studies that employ the capital market imperfection approach in the literature on inequality and growth. Now turn to the second possible case, Figure  7 , a locally stable steady-state equilibrium occurs at (0,b L ) in this case. Although the long-run performance of the economy is more sensitive to the initial distribution than in the benchmark case, one can Þnd the qualitatively same effect of distribution, which depends on the scarcity of initial resources.
For the last case,
is a steady-state equilibrium. Hence, the role of distribution becomes less important; regardless of the initial distribution, any economy endowed with B 0 > b converges to the egalitarian steady-state equilibrium, (b,b).
Redistribution and Welfare
Consider now redistribution of wealth, B 0 , by controlling λ S as well as b S 0 . A few remarks deserve to be made at this point. First, by deÞnition, λ L and b L 0 are uniquely determined for a given set of λ S , b S 0 and B 0 . Second, the degree of inequality is changed by the relative size of the two groups as well as the distribution of wealth across the two groups. With a small value of λ S , one can execute more drastic redistribution of wealth; distribution biased toward group S allots the small fraction of population the large portion of national wealth, generating high inequality. Third, and Þnally, changing the group size affects the ratiob S /b S andb L /b L and the nature of the dynamical system. If a sufficiently small level of λ S is chosen, Lemma 11 suggests that the system is characterized by the benchmark case presented previously, and the remaining cases do not take place. It is shown that the initial distribution of wealth determines the economy's long-run performance when the amount of wealth is neither extremely abundant nor scarce:
Recall that the egalitarian steady-state level (b,b) is independent of the choice of λ S .
On the other hand, if moderate redistribution is executed by choosing a sufficiently large level of λ S , λ S /λ L approaches one, and the heterogeneity across the two groups generates the dynamical system characterized by either of the last two cases. However, the last case,b S <b S andb L <b L , may not occur under (38). The feasibility of the last case is assured under a stronger condition on the structural parameters, such as a higher level of A. The discussion in Subsections 3.3-3.4 can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 1. Under (38), highly unequal distribution of initial wealth is desirable from the viewpoint of the richer members and their offspring, but not from the long-term viewpoint of society.
OUTPUT GROWTH
The preceding analysis has fully revealed the process of economic development in terms of intergenerational transfers. By considering the underlying evolution of output, one can examine the impact of initial wealth distribution on the behavior of output growth. This section uses subscripts i and j, where i, j = S, L and i 6 = j, to indicate the richer and poorer groups, respectively. It is assumed that income distribution at time 0 is highly unequal in the absence of redistribution. More accurately, h i 0 = h(e(k 0 )) and adult individuals of group j initially possess neither advanced skills nor physical capital.
Aggregate Transfers
At the outset, consider the economy is in Regimes 2 or 3 in period t, (b S t , b L t ) ∈ R 2 ++ . As follows from (1), (2) and (14),
Since either
is the case in both Regimes, (6) and (39) prove that aggregate transfers in Regimes 2 and 3 are
Next suppose that the economy is in Regime 1 in period t − 1. Then skilled workers with human capital h(e(k t )) are a fraction λ i of adult individuals in period t, and unskilled workers are 1 − λ i of adult individuals in period t. Noting h j t = h(0) = 1, the output in period t is
Given the properties of e(k t ) and h(k t ), there exists a unique k t for a given pair (Y t , λ i ).
It follows that
Then the wage rate can be written as
, which preserves the above properties of κ(Y t , λ). 19 Unskilled workers (the poorer members) receive
and as follows from (39), skilled workers receive
where αY t is the return on savings, R t K t , noting (1) and (2). Hence, all workers' incomes strictly monotonically increase with output, and will be zero if no output is produced.
Furthermore, noting (41),
are respectively the minimum levels of output that induce skilled workers who own assets and unskilled workers to transfer wealth to their offspring at time t.
The last property of Corollary 2 suggests that b Under these conditions, unskilled workers transfer no wealth to their offspring in period t and the economy is in Regime 1 in both periods t and t − 1.
Substituting for I i t from (41) into (6) for Regime 1 and recalling (40) for Regimes 2 and 3, we obtain the expression for aggregate transfers in each of the three regimes:
Note that ù Y (1) = θ as shown in Corollary 2 and B Y (Y t , λ) > 0 as follows from (41). Furthermore, if e 00 (k) ≤ 0 for all k > 0,
The Þrst property suggests that the inequality generated by a small fraction of the rich stimulates resource accumulation in the early stages of development, and the qualitative effect is reversed at Y =Ŷ , the critical level dividing Regimes 1 and 2. 20 The second property implies that the positive effect of inequality on aggregate transfers is more conductive at lower levels of development.
The Evolution of Output within Regimes
We may now proceed to the description of the evolution of output in each regime. Substitution for B t from (43) into (21) establishes 4.2.1. Regime 1 and Regime 3. First consider the evolution of output in Regimes 1 and 3. It is convenient to deÞne
The function exhibits properties such that
, and the second derivative is negative for λ = 1. 21 As will become apparent, Φ λ (Y t , λ), the effect of equality, is negative at lower levels of Y t and the sign is reversed at higher levels of Y t . The use of (18) yields the capital-skill ratio
implying k t+1 is strictly monotonically increasing with Y t . Moreover, for all λ ∈ (0, 1],
The last property stems from the fact that individuals' investment in human capital is subject to diminishing marginal returns.
Lemma 12. Under (15), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1], 
is unstable at b(λ) and stable atb(λ). Hence part i establishes the result.
The Þrst result is not to say that Y (λb(λ), 0, λ) is necessarily a steady-state level of output. The second result asserts that there is no steady-state level of output on the interval (Ȳ i ,Ȳ i ). To understand the Þrst point, note that 
steady-state level of output whenb i <b i , as shown byb L <b L in Figure 7 . Conversely, Notes. There exists a locally stable steady-state equilibrium in each of Regimes 1 and 3. In the early stages of development, the economy starting in Regime 1 produces higher output than the economy starting in Regime 3. However, the former economy is unable to take off from Regime 1 to Regime 2, converging to the lower-level steady state where Yt =Ȳ S .
ifb i ≥b i , which corresponds tob S ≥b S in Figure 7 ,Ȳ i is a nontrivial, locally stable, steady-state equilibrium that occurs in Regime 1.
In contrast tob i , bothb ≡b(1) and b ≡ b(1) are steady-state levels of transfers in Regime 3 regardless of the ratiob i /b i , and Ȳ ≡ Y (b, 0, 1) andȲ ≡ Y (b, 0, 1) are the corresponding steady-state levels of output. It should be noted that, by deÞnition, Ȳ andȲ are independent of the fraction of richer members, λ i ; i.e., ∂Ȳ /∂λ i = ∂Ȳ /∂λ i = 0. Figure 8 illustrates the evolution of output in Regime 1 and Regime 3 for the small fraction of richer members,Ŷ S ≥Ȳ S . As follows from Lemma 11, for a set of parameters that satisfy condition (38),Ŷ S ≥Ȳ S wheneverŶ L ≥Ȳ L , yet the reverse is not true. For this reason, we treatŶ S ≥Ȳ S as a general case.
In the diagram, Ȳ S stands for the steady-state level of output for
and it is assumed that b(λ S ) = {b S ,b S } for the simplicity of the exposition. One can see the function Φ 1S (Y t ) crossing the 45 • line at Ȳ S andȲ S , and the function Φ 3 (Y t ) crossing the 45 • line at Ȳ andȲ . As shown in Lemma 3, b S < b and hence Ȳ S < Ȳ . In addition,Ȳ S <Ȳ follows from Proposition 1. Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of output in Regime 1 and Regime 3 for the large fraction of the rich,Ŷ L <Ȳ L . UnlikeȲ S in Figure 8 ,Ȳ L is not a steady-state level of output and the economy starting in Regime 1 automatically enters Regime 2. 4.2.2. Regime 2 and Regime 3. We are now in a position to examine the evolution of output in Regimes 2 and 3. One can Þnd that Φ 2i (Y t , b j t ) and Φ 3 (Y t ) exhibits the qualitatively same property with respect to Y t since B t = B(Y t , 1) in both Regimes, Recall that credit constraints are binding in the poorer group in Regime 2, whereas all individuals are free from the constraints and spend e t in Regime 3. Since e t is the optimal level of education to maximize the output at time t + 1, Φ 2i (Y t , b j t ) is smaller than Φ 3 (Y t ) when b j t , which is b c t , does not coincide with e t . That is,
where Y cc is a value such that
) and an increase in λ i , the fraction of the richer members, narrows the gap
, where b is constant and greater than zero. As illustrated in Figure 10 , the fact that e(k t+1 ) increases with Y t while b is constant creates a discrepancy between e(k t+1 ) and b. Given that Y cc0 (b) > 0, an increase in b shifts Φ 2i (Y t , b) gradually to the left along the envelope curve Φ 3 (Y t ).
The Short-Run Effect of Inequality
We now examine how a change in λ, the fraction of people who are not creditconstrained, affects the dynamical system Lemma 13.
Proof. The Þrst result follows from (46) and ù
where, noting ω(
The above results are illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 , where they intersect each other at
Proof. Follows from Lemma 13 and that Ȳ < Y • must occur because of Ȳ i < Ȳ .
We have therefore found that
One can view the distance Φ 1i (Y t ) − Φ 3 (Y t ) as the impact of inequality on Y t+1 at a given level of Y t or, to put it another way, at a given stage of development. Furthermore, as long as the economy on each path remains in its initial regime, the discrepancy in the subsequent growth paths of output tells us the impact of the redistribution on the
growth process. Redistribution can be executed in a more drastic fashion by choosing a smaller number of the rich, λ i .
Since intergenerational transfers are a luxury good, poorer households leave no wealth to their offspring at underdeveloped stages, which are associated with low wages. As noted earlier, as long as Y t is belowŶ i , there is a discrepancy in personal saving rates between richer and poorer people, and inequality enhances aggregate levels of transfers, savings, and physical capital by suppressing aggregate consumption. Equally important, this positive effect is generally more signiÞcant at lower output levels. Although, less equal distribution causes educational inequality and low productivity of output as discussed in Section 2.3, the positive effect of inequality is proven to be dominant for
At low levels of development, scarce amounts of physical capital together with the capital-skill complementarity give rise to lower returns on education relative to savings, which in turn discourages the private investment in education. Therefore, the scarcity of physical capital, rather than credit constraints, is the prime reason for low stocks of average human capital. Accordingly the positive impact of inequality outweighs the negative one for
Yet as illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 , the difference Φ 1i (Y t ) − Φ 3 (Y t ) narrows down as output increases towards Y • . The accompanying accumulation of physical capital raises the return on skills and thereby intensiÞes the negative effect of inequality on human capital accumulation, as long as liquidity constraints are binding. The gap between Φ 1i (Y t ) and Φ 3 (Y t ) therefore shrinks as output increases towards Y • . 23 At the same time, inequality becomes less conductive for aggregate saving at higher levels of Y t . Since this positive effect disappears atŶ i , where w t = θ, the two opposing effects of inequality offset each other at Y • (<Ŷ i ) to the point of negating their values, and the negative effect becomes dominant for Y t > Y • .
Inequality and the Pattern of Development
By integrating all the results demonstrated so far, one can analyze the impact of initial income distribution on the behavior of output growth. For this purpose, we employ the approach of comparing hypothetical economies that are identical in all respects except for their initial distributions of wealth.
Recall that h i 0 = h(e(k 0 )) and adult individuals of group j initially possess neither advanced skills nor physical capital. In the absence of redistribution,
and
We limit the analysis to the case in which regardless of the initial regime, the economy ends up with a positive amount of resources, andunskilled workers initially leave no bequests. This is the case if 
ii. The result is proven by combining the above proof with the one in Proposition 3 and noting (b S t , b L t ) increases in Regime 2.
Remark 2. In the Þrst case of Proposition 2, Y t may decrease over time. Figure 8 depicts the caseŶ S ≥Ȳ S . The economy that starts off in Regime 1 fails to take off to Regime 2. Since individuals' investment in human capital is subject to diminishing marginal returns, less equal opportunities for education among individuals retards the accumulation of aggregate human capital, and this adverse effect increases as the cost of being unskilled rises with output. Furthermore, as argued previously, the increase in the wage income over time diminishes the positive effect of inequality on aggregate saving. Their net effect on factor accumulation eventually turns negative, and this qualitative change leads the economy starting out in Regime 1 to the lower-level steady state. Figure 9 depicts the caseŶ L <Ȳ L , which is brought about by a sufficiently large fraction of the richer members in society. Now that moderate inequality in education opportunity mitigates the adverse effect of selective human capital accumulation on output growth, the economy with less equal distribution does not end up with Regime 1. It endogenously enters Regime 2 when the wage rate reaches the level that induces unskilled workers to transfer wealth to their offspring. Although b L t rises concurrently with e t over Regime 2, Figure 7 ensures that b L t eventually catches up with e t , and once that occurs, the economy enters Regime 3. Consequently Y t evolves towardȲ , and
approaches the egalitarian steady-state point (b,b). Wealth inequality thus improves in the long run, albeit not necessarily monotonically, and the evolution of wealth inequality exhibits an inverted U-curve. Now consider a redistribution of wealth
)/λ i as follows from (39). Due to assumption (51), one can achieve (52) by choosing a sufficiently small gap between I S 0 and I L 0 . It follows from (52) and
Proposition 3. Under (38), (51), and (52), Y t increases strictly monotonically in either Regime 2 or Regime 3 for all t ≥ 0 and converges to the steady-state levelȲ in Regime 3.
Proof. Consider Figure 7 .
, the economy is in either Regime 2 or Regime 3 in all periods, and eventually enters Regime 3 to approach (b,b). Hence Y t correspondingly converges toȲ .
Suppose that the economy enters Regime 2 in period t > 0. The diagram shows that
. Thus Y t < Y t+1 follows from (40). Since Lemma 12 implies Y t < Φ 3 (Y t ) if and only if Y t ∈ (Ȳ ,Ȳ ), (49) shows that Ȳ < Y t < Y t+1 <Ȳ if the economy is in Regime 2 at time t > 0.
The above result, together with Y 0 ∈ (Ȳ ,Ȳ ), proves Y t < Y t+1 if the economy is in Regime 3 at time t ≥ 0.
As follows from Propositions 2-3, the economy that has a high equality, (52), or a moderate inequality, (50) andŶ i <Ȳ i , evolves over time toward the highest steadystate level of output,Ȳ . On the other hand, the economy with a substantially unequal distribution, (50) andŶ i ≥Ȳ i , is unable to reach that level and undergoes a lower growth path in the long run.
Theorem 2. Consider a group of countries that differ only in their initial wealth distributions. Under (38) and (51), i. If a country has a highly unequal wealth distribution in an underdeveloped stage, it will attain higher levels of output in the short run yet converge to a lower-level steady-state equilibrium. ii. If a country has a highly unequal distribution of wealth in a well-developed stage, it will attain lower levels of output in all subsequent periods and converge to a lower-level steady-state equilibrium. iii. If countries have similar levels of initial inequality, they will converge to the same steady-state equilibrium, regardless of their initial regimes.
Proof. The theorem follows from Corollary 11, Propositions 2-3 and Figures 8-10.
Overtaking in growth performance results from the initial dominance of the positive effect of inequality and the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. Furthermore, divergence applies to countries starting out in the mature stages of development where the adverse effect of inequality on human capital outweighs the positive effect of inequality on aggregate saving.
A few remarks deserve special emphasis at this point. First, overtaking takes place after the output of a lagging country reaches Y • . Second, the model abstracts from technological change, and the introduction of technological progress will permit steady-state growth with a positive rate. Regardless of this formulation, inequality will constrain output growth in the long run, as asserted by the Þrst two results of the proposition. Yet the last result will not hold because the convergence in growth rates does not imply the convergence in income levels. Third and lastly, overtaking is likely to occur under the condition that the marginal productivity of physical capital is sufficiently high. This is becauseb(λ) goes to inÞnity as α approaches 1, as shown earlier, whereas this is not the case forb(λ). 24 Provided that α is sufficiently small, a major fraction of national income is dominated by asset owners since production of Þnal output relies primarily on physical capital. This uneven system of factor payments slows down the increase in the wage income relative to output, intensifying the adverse effect of credit constraints on human capital accumulation.
Factor Accumulation
Countries starting out in different regimes experience different patterns of factor accumulation. Firstly, as follows from (15), the aggregate physical capital in Regimes 1 and 3 is K(B t , λ) ≡ B t − λe(k(B t /λ, 0, λ)), whereby K t+1 = K(B t , λ i ) for Regime 1 and K t+1 = K(B t , 1) for Regime 3. As proven in the Appendix,
Recalling B(Y t , λ i ) ≥ B(Y t , 1) for Y t ≤Ŷ i and Theorem 2, we Þnd that in the early stages of development, inequality promotes the accumulation of physical capital. Secondly, the aggregate human capital in Regimes 1 and 3 is expressed as H(B t , λ) ≡ (1 − λ) + λh(e(k(B t /λ, 0, λ))), whereby H t+1 = H(B t , λ i ) for Regime 1 and H t+1 = H(B t , 1) for Regime 3. As follows from (18), This means that if the size of the rich is sufficiently small, their high educational attainments would not be reßected in aggregate human capital. Using this result, one can then Þnd a small value λ i such that H(B 0 t , λ i ) < H(B t , 1) for 0 < B t ≤ B 0 t . Thus, despite the relative abundance of B t , less egalitarian economies encounter a delay in human capital accumulation in the early stages of development. As shown earlier, this adverse effect of inequality becomes dominant in later stages. This is conÞrmed by H(B t , λ i ) < H(B t , 1) for B t > 0 and 0 < λ i < 1.
and by Proposition 1, which asserts that in the long run, economies in Regime 3 produce greater amounts of aggregate transfers than those in Regime 1. This tendency of inequality generating overinvestment in physical capital and underinvestment in human capital implies an unbalanced ratio of physical to human capital (18) yields
where, as shown in (19), k t+1 = k(B t /λ i , 0, λ i ) in Regime 1 and k t+1 = k(B t , 0, 1) in Regime 3.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This research develops a theory about the role of inequality in the overtaking of growth performance across countries. The proposed theory highlights two opposing effects of income inequality on factor accumulation and argue that the qualitative change in their combined effect is a prime cause of overtaking. Inequality enhances physical capital accumulation by concentrating wealth among individuals whose marginal propensity to save is relatively high. Conversely, in the presence of borrowing constraints, inequality acts as a barrier to the universal investment in human capital that is a prerequisite for sustained growth. Due to the eventual dominance of this negative effect of inequality, countries characterized by highly unequal wealth distributions will fail to take off and be overtaken in the long run. It is also shown that divergence or convergence may arise instead of overtaking, depending on the initial levels of development and inequality. Sufficiently developed countries with different levels of inequality will diverge in income levels. On the other hand, countries that have similar levels of inequality will converge to the same steady state, regardless of their initial regimes.
Although the analysis Þnds that the effect of inequality in the early stages of development is positive, there are two major forces that make overtaking less probable than divergence. The one is that the positive effect of inequality is the dominant factor only in underdeveloped stages, where the saving rate differential among individuals is significant. The other is that globalization of international capital markets encourages the If e 00 (k t+1 ) ≤ 0, ∀k t+1 > 0, Corollary 1 asserts b i = b i
